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INTRODUCTION
Until the eighties Japan was mainly concerned with high economic
growth promoted by consíderable exports to the United States and
Western Europe. The Japanese companíes and fínancial instítutions
could finance the required investments from the voluminous household
savíngs and could also accumulate substantial reserves. These reserves
enabled Japanese companies to extend strongly their direct foreign
investments during the eighties. Furthermore, after the ríse of
Japanese industry, the second half of the eighties were characterized
by the advance of Japanese banking and securities business. The
financial institutions were primarily focused on domestic develop-
ments, but during the recent years they became more conscious of their
dominance in the global financial system. Measured by the size of
assets, no less than nine of the ten biggest banks in the world are
Japanesel). Furthermore, the big four Japanese securitíes companíes
all belong to the world top 10. Moreover, the monetary policy by the
Bank of Japan increasingly affects the international monetary system.
On the one side the domestic credít expansion in Japan influences the
global money supply, on the other side Japanese exchange and money
market management plays a prominent part in the process of internatio-
nal monetary coordinatíon within the Group of Saven (G7).
In this article we will discuss the evolution of the financial system
in Japan and its consequences for the monetary policy implemented by
the Bank of Japan. Fírstly, the Japanese fínancial institutions and
markets are set out with emphasis on depository institutions and on
interbank and open money markets because of their relevance for
monetary policy.
Secondly, we describe the progress of financíal innovation and libera-
lization in Japan which took off in the late seventies and early
eightíes.
Thirdly, the objectives, indicators and instruments of monetary policy
by the Bank are analysed wíth special reference to the transmission
mechanísm of monetary policy. A distinction is made between the
traditional, new and modern monetary policy.FIGURE 1 A classification of Japanese financial institutions
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The Japanese financial institutions can be divided into fínancial
intermediaríes and other institutions and the intermediaries can be
subdivided into depository and non-depository institutions. A classi-
fication of financial institutions according to their business featu-




The city banks are the largest of all commercial banks and hold 20á of
the total deposíts of all financial ínstitutions. These banks are
based in large cities. They possess extensive branch networks within
Japan and have also internatíonal business networks. The city banks
provide the greater part of short-term finance to domestic companies
and belong all to the world's 25 largest banks2).
The regional banks have their headquarters throughout the country not
only in large cíties, but also in smaller cities. These banks mostly
operate in local areas, i.e. theír prefectures. They conduct the same
business as city banks, although on a smaller scale. The regional
banks lend to individuals and small-to medium-sized business. Their
main source of funding are indívidual deposits.
The long-term credit banks (LTCBs) are the most important group within
the long-term financial institutions. The three LTCBs were organized
under the Long-Term Credit Bank Law to provide long-term finance to
domestic manufacturers. They carry out their fundíng mainly by deben-
tures, but are also allowed to accept deposits from the Japanese
government, local governments and private companies.
The seven trust banks are another group of long-term financial insti-
tutions. These banks are -unlike the LTCBs- permítted to conduct both
ordinary banking and trust businesses under separate accounts. Their
trust activities consist of the management of loans and funds and
include e.g. money trusts, securities investment trusts and pension
funds.a
The financial instítutions for small businesses compríse three groups:
the sogo banks, the shinkin banks and the credit cooperatives. The
sogo banks used to be mutual non-profit organizations, but were
converted in 1951 into profit-oriented corporations. The shinkin banks
are mutual associations of small businesses and provide ordinary
banking services and installment businesses to their members. The
credit cooperatives are cooperative financial institutions on a mutual
base for small businesses and accept deposits and installment savings
from their members to lend or discount bills to them.
The Zenshinren Bank and the National Federation of Credit Cooperatives
act as the central bank for respectively the shinkin banks and credit
cooperatives.
The financial institutions for agriculture, forestry and fishery are
organízed on national, prefectorial and municipal level. They provide
financial services to farmers, foresters and fishermen on a mutual
base. The Norinchukin Bank acts as the central bank for these institu-
tions. This bank is the seventh largest of the world and holds the
biggest private portfolio of Japanese governments bonds.
The main non-depository institutíons are the ínsurance companies,
which are legally divided in two groups: the life insurance companies
and non-life insurance companies (fire and marine insurance compa-
nies). The insurance companies use their premiums to lend to industri-
al corporations and, recently, to invest ín securities. They hold the
largest portfolio of Japanese stocks. The securíties companies belong
to the other fínancial institutions. They dominate the primary and
secondary markets for domestic stocks and bonds, but also play a role
in the open money markets. The "big four" securities companies are
Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi and conduct about 70á of the total
underwriting and half of all trades on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The most important public financial institution is the Postal Savings
System with a network of approximately 24.000 local post offices and
30g of all deposits by Japanese households. This institution ís under
the supervision of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
FINANCIAL MARKETS
The Japanese financial markets are to be divided into the money
markets for (very) short-term finance and the capítal markets for5
medium -and long- term finance. The money markets with assets of less
than one year maturity can be subdivided in the interbank and open
money markets. The capital markets with assets of more than one year
maturity may be split up into the primary and secondary markets for
stocks and bonds and other markets based on these markets, such as the
bond futures market . Hence, we shall concentrate on the money
markets because of their importance for monetary policy making in
Japan. The heart of the money market are the interbank markets where
only financial institutions borrow and lend short-term funds. The main
borrowers in the interbank markets are the city banks and large
regional banks, e.g. the Bank of Yokohama, and the most important
lenders are the Zenshinren Bank and the Norinchukin Bank.
The interbank markets comprise three parts: the call (money) market,
the (commercíal) bills market and the dollar call (money) market.
Since 1927 the call market requires as collateral government bonds or
bills emitted by corporations. However, in 1985 an uncollateralized
call market was created whích became attractive for foreign banks for
the lack of collateral.
Both on the collateralized and uncollateralized call market funds were
traded with a very short maturíty, from overnight till three weeks.
The bills market began in 1971 as a market for discounting commercial
bílls with a maturity from 1 to 6 months. The Bank of Japan is the
main buyer in the bills market and uses this market for its money
market operations.
The dollar call market was created ín 1972 to borrow and lend foreign
currency funds -mostly US dollars- with a(very) short maturíty in
Tokyo. Only domestic and foreign banks have access to this market.
Besides the interbank money markets, there are also the open money
markets in which both financial and non-financial institutions can
participate. The open markets include eight different submarkets: the
gensaki market, the certificate of deposit (CD) market, the Euro-yen
market, the banker's acceptance (BA) market, the financial bills (FB)
market, the treasury bills (TB) market, the Japan Off-shore market
(JOM) and the commercial paper (CP) market. The gensaki market was
established in 1949 as a market to sell~buy temporarily securities.
These securities will be repurchased~resold at a predetermined time
and price within 6 months after the sale~purchase. In 1979 CDs were
introduced by depository institutíons, especially city banks. Becausethe CD rates are unregulated and negotiable, the CD market became an
important open market in successive years. On the Euro-yen market off-
shore transactions can be conducted without collateral and withhol-
ding tax. This market may be considered as one of the most liberalized
open markets and thus functíons as an substitute for domestic open
markets.
The BA market was created in 1985 for trading BAs, i.e. a fixed-term
bill of exchange issued by an exporter or importer to settle a trade
transaction and then underwritten by a bank. Because of the progressi-
ve stamp tax on the issue of BAs, the volume of this market has
shrinked since its establishment.
On the FB market temporary shortages of government funds are covered
by discount bills wíth a maturity of mostly 60 days. The FB rates are
below the level of the discount rate and market rates and therefore
all issued FBs are subscribed by the Sank of Japan. The volume of this
market is relatívely limited until now.
The TB market is also intended to finance temporary government shorta-
ges, but the discount bills have a maturity of 60 or 90 days and are
only issued for refunding. This market reached a volume of Yen 5.5
trillion by end-March 1990.
The JOM, whích was established in december 1986, is a relatively non-
regulated market for transactions between non-residents. The JOM is
separated from the domestic financial markets and has become one of
the leading offshore centers of the world.
In November 1987 the CP market was established and its volume has
grown considerably since then. CPs are short-term assets issued by
non-financial institutions to replace bank loans. They allow more
flexible funding to corporations at lower costs. The CP market is
often called a quasi-interbank market, because CPs are mainly traded
among banks.
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND LIBERALIZATION
Till the end of the sixties the pace of financial innovation was slow
in Japan. From 1973 this changed by the transítion to floating exchan-
ge rates and the rise of inflation rates throughout the world. Fur-
thermore, the first oil crisis resulted in large issues of Japanese
government bonds to finance public debt. In addition, there was a?
development towards open money and capital markets, in particular
Euro-currency markets. Finally, the rapíd progress of computer and
information technology resulted in lower costs of financial inno-
vations and higher profit opportuníties for financial institutions.
The most important financial ínnovations were the íntroduction of CDs
in May 1979 and money market certificates (MMCs) in March 1985 by
banks and the creation of so-called chukoku funds -i.e. portfolios
containing medium-term government bonds- in January 1980 by securities
companies4). The processes of financial innovations and fi.nancial
liberalization had theit impact on the Japanese financial system. At
first this meant a gradual relaxation and abolishment of interest rate
regulations - i.c. interest rate ceilings - for large bank deposits.
As a result, interest rates for deposits of three months to two years
maturity with a minimum amount of one billion yen were fully liberali-
zed in October 1985. Furthermore, this minimum for large time deposits
was gradually reduced to 20 million yen. However, a complete liberali-
zation of interest rates for small time deposits is hampered by the
existence of a non-profít-oriented Postal Savings System which can not
be enforced to determine its interest rates by market rates. Another
aspect of liberalization was the reduction of the minimum amount for
CDs to 100 million yen and for MMCs to 10 million yen and the abolish-
ment of the maximum volume for issues of CDs and MMCs. The process of
liberalization resulted, as might be expected, in a rise of the open
money market volume and a decline of the interbank money market volume
from 1984. As a consequence, the Bank of Japan influenced the money
market interest rate not only by transactions in the interbank market
(mainly call and bills market), but also conducted operations in the
open market (in particular gensaki and CD market). This development
continued until the Autwnn of 1988 when the volume of the interbank
market, especíally the bills market, shrinked as a result of increa-
sing open market rates, compared with relatively stable interest rates
in the interbank market. The decreasing volume of the interbank market
reduced the influence of the Bank of Japan on the money market rate
and compelled the Bank to deregulate the interbank market as from
November 1988.
Firstly, the Bank liberalized the ínterest rate of (commercial) bills
which was regulated till then.
Secondly, the range of maturities for the call and bills market wasFIGURE 2 The interbank and open market rates before and
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adjusted in order to realize more fine tuning in the money market5).
Thirdly, the quantitative restrictions for the uncollateralized call
market were abolished and the permitted maturity for this market was
extended to reinforce the arbitrage between interbank and open mar-
kets. These swift and radical measures by the Bank of Japan resulted
in more than a doubling of the interbank market volume during the
period November 1988-July 1989.
Moreover, the arbitrage between interbank and open markets strenghened
in that period as appears from the narrowing difference of interbank




Hence, we will discuss the segmentation within the Japanese financíal
system. An important characteristic of this system is the still
existing separation of banking and securitíes business. In the pre-
war period, there was no legal provision which separated banking and
securities business in Japan. After the war the legal base for the
separation of depository and non-depository institutions was founded
clearly in the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948, in particular by
Artícle 65 of that law. The Japanese law was based on the Glass-
Steagall Act which separated banking and securities business similarly
in the United States. Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law
prohibits banks from engaging in the securities business, unless there
is an investment motive or a trust contract. Furthermore, this law
provides with a separation within the deposítory institutions, between
commercial banks and long-term financial ínstitutions. As a result of
the ongoing process of financial liberalization, the segmentation
between short-term en long-term financial activities and between
banking and securities business is slowly but steadily losing impor-
tance. In various reports of the Financial System Research Council
(affiliated with the Banking Buresu, Ministry of Finance) and discus-
sions by the Securitíes and Exchange Council (affiliated wíth the
Securities Bureau), this desegmentatíon process is extensively discus-
sed. Undoubtedly, in the coming years the structure of the Japanese
financial system will as a consequence of these developments drasti-cally change.
MONETARY POLICY
In this section, attention will be paid to the channels of transmis-
sion in the monetary policy process.
In the transmission mechanism of monetary polícy a number of monetary
variables play an important role. These variables provide the central
bank with the necessary informatíon about the orientation and effecti-
veness of its monetary policy. Figure 3 shows the transmission mecha-
nism.
FIGURE 3 The transmission mechanism of monetary policy
Instruments -. Indicator(s)
Based on Eijffinger (1986)
Target(s) Goal(s)
The indicator is the starting point of the monetary policy process.
This monetary variable is close to the central bank and is directly
affected by the policy instruments. The relationship of the indicator
with the goals of monetary policy, í.e. the final policy objectives,
is according to Suzuki (1987) somewhat unstable. Therefore, the target
is used as an intermediate objective. The target is farther from the
control of the central bank and is not directly affected by the policy
instruments, but its relationship with the goals of monetary policy is
relatively stable.
In the following subsectíons, a brief analysis of the monetary polícy
transmission mechanism in Japan is presented for three subsequent pe-
riods. A distinction will be made between the traditional, new and
modern monetary policy.
THE TRADITIONAL MONETARY POLICY 1953-1975
The traditional monetary polícy coincided with the so called High
Growth Period, the period of excessive economic growth whích started
in 1953. During this period the main source of corporate finance was
bank credit. The heavy dependence of the corporate sector on credit
from money creating financial institutions, i.e. the aituation of
overborrowing and the predominance of indirect finance, was maínly10
caused by the underdevelopment of the capítal markets and the existen-
ce of the main bank system and the so called Keíretsu. Most companies
had a very close relationship with one or more main banks. These banks
operated as a kind of lender of last resort and supported their client
banks in many ways. The Keíretsu are conglomerates of cooperating fi-
nancial and non-financial enterprises ozganized on an informal basis.
The participating enterprises could borrow on favourable terms from
the financial institutions iu the Keiretsu. The main bank structure
and Keíretsu still exist today and contribute to credit based corpora-
te financial structures in Japan.
Another important characteristic of the Japanese financial system, or
more specifically of the Japanese banking system, during the period
1953-1975 was the so called situation of overloan. Suzuki describes
overloan as "... the existence of loans and investments funded from
sources other than deposits and equity capital, so that reserve assets
(taken as the sum of central bank money plus second-line reserve
assets minus borrowed funds) are consistently negative" (Suzuki
(1980), p.5). Borrowed funds include loans from the central bank and
borrowing from the money market. It is important to stress that in the
case of Japan overloan not only exísted at a micro level, i.e. a
situation of overloan of individual banks, but also at a macro Level.
The macro based situation of overloan implied that the banking system
as a whole was in debt to the Bank of Japan and depended vary much for
its funding on central bank credit.
It will become clear from the followíng analysis that the heavy
dependence of the corporate sector on bank credit and the situation of
overloan were of great importance for the implementatíon of the
traditíonal monetary policy. On the basis of fígure 1 we will present
a brief review of Japanese monetary policy during the period 1953-
1975.
The starting point of the traditíonal monetary policy was formed by
the ínterbank (money) markets. The Bank of Japan used the interbank
interest rates, i.e. the ca11 rate and after 1971 the bill discount
rate, as indicators. The call market is the market for borrowing and
lending of short term funds by fínancial instítutions. The bill
discount market is the market for discounting of bills and was esta-
blished in 1971.
The Bank of Japan exerted great ínfluence on the interbank (money)11
markets through íts lending policy. Of great importance in this policy
was the reserve system of the Bank, which is still effectíve today.
The commercial financial institution~ are under the reserve system
required to hold non-interest bearing deposits at the Bank of Japan
against their private deposits. In May 1986, the Bank introduced a
progressive schedule of reserve ratios.
The financial institutíons are free to decide the daily amount of
these deposits, íf at the end of the reserve period the compulsory
amount of reserve deposits is attained. The reserve deposits consist
mainly of credit of the Bank of Japan, so the lendíng policy of the
Bank has a great ímpact on the reserve position of financial institu-
tions. It is important to stress the focus of the lending policy of
the Bank of Japan at the so called reserve progress ratio, i.e. the
ratio of the actual amount of reserve deposits to the compulsory
amount of reserve deposits. By changing the amount of its credit, the
Bank of Japan exerts great influence on the amount of reserve deposits
at financial institutions and so on the interbank interest rates. For
example, ratíoning of credit by the Bank of Japan decreases the sum of
the individual reserve progress ratios of the various financial
institutions. When the end of the reserve period comes nearer, finan-
cial institutions with an insufficient amount of reserve deposits
(i.e. below the compulsory level at the end of the reserve period
concerned) are forced to borrow in the interbank markets. As a result,
interbank interest rates will rise.
The lending policy of the Bank of Japan was very effective during the
period 1953-1975, mainly as a result of the macro sítuation of over-
loan. This situation implied that banks were heavily dependent on
central bank credit and therefore changes in the amount of credit of
the Bank of Japan did have great consequences for the reserve and
funding positions of banks and consequently for the interbank inte-
rest rates.
Besides the lending policy the Bank of Japan did have other policy
instruments to contzol interbank interest rates. The various instru-
ments are presented in figure 4.
The main instrument was the lending policy of the Bank of Japan. The
securities and bills operations, i.e. the buying and selling of
securities and bills by the Bank of Japan, were focused on neutrali-
zing money market surpluses and shortages. Changes in the official12
discount rate were intended to give signals about the policy intenti-
ons of the Bank of Japan (announcement effect). Changes in the reserve
ratios, which determine the amount of reserves banks have to deposit
at the Bank of Japan in relation to their deposíts and other liabi-
lities, only had a modest effect on interbank interest rates.
The implicit interest rate regulation was an informal instrument of
the Bank of Japan to regulate interbank ínterest rates. The interbank
interest rates were fixed after close consultations between the Bank
of Japan, the Tanshi instítutions (money market dealers whích are
according to Suzuki (1987) active as specialized transaction interme-
diaries in the short-term money markets) and the Sanmeikai, the
representative body of the city banks. The Bank of Japan did have a
great influence in these consultations, so that the interbank interest
rates could be fixed according to the policy objectives of the Bank.


















Partly based on Fukui (1986)
The target of the traditional monetary policy was the broadly based
lending by banks, mainly to the corporate sector. Broadly based
corporate credit included ordinary bank credit to the corporate sector
and the absorptíon of corporate bills and securities by banks. The13
main argument ín favour of this specific target was the situation of
overborrowing and predominance of indirect finance. Because of these
situations broadly based corporate credit was a good proxy for the
volume of business investments and the level of economic growth.
The process by which the interbank interest rates (the indicators)
affected the direction of the broadly based lending by banks was very
clear and stable and can be presented as follows. Interest rates on
broadly based bank credit were, mainly as a result of legal regulati-
ons, informal agreements and cultural customs, inflexible compared
with interbank interest rates. The rigid structure of credit interest
rates resulted ín substitution effects between (on the one hand) acti-
vities of banks in the interbank (money) markets and (on the other
hand) the amount of broadly based lending by banks. For example, when
interbank interest rates rose (as a result of monetary policy actions
by the Bank of Japan), the ínflexibílity of credit interest rates
caused a shift out of bank credit towards investments in the interbank
(money) markets.
The end of the monetary policy process is the link between the tar-
get(s) and the goal(s). The main goals of the traditional monetary
policy were the achíevement of príce stability (i.e. the consumer
price index (CPI) and equilibrium in the balance of payments (BOP).
Through regulation of the broadly based lending by banks the Bank of
Japan was able to control the level of busíness investments, i.e. the
main impetus of the high economic growth, and therefore aggregate
demand, inflation and the balance of payments.
An additional instrument to control the broadly based lendíng by banks
was the so called window guidance, ín the words of Suzuki (1987) '...
guidance to the financial institutions to keep the increase in their
lending to clients within limits that the Bank of Japan feels to be
appropriate". The window guidance is a kind of moral suasion, but as a
result of the situation of overloan, this form of monetary policy can
be very effectíve.
Fígure 5 shows a review of the traditional monetary policy.14
FIGURE 5 The traditional monetary policy
Amount of Bank of Japan credit
Discount rate
Reserve ratío operations
Securities and bills operations









THE NEW MONETARY POLICY 1975-1981
During the first part of the seventies the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system and the oil crisis had a great impact on the world
economy. Economic growth in Japan slowed down and the government was
forced to introduce an accomodating Keynesian oriented monetary and
economic policy. As a result of these developments the rate of infla-
tion increased rapidly.
The crisis in the Japanese economy had great consequences for the
economíc and financial structures. The shift to lower growth reduced
the corporate demand for credit and resulted in a sharp decline in the
situation of overborrowing. The large-scale issues of government
bonds, necessary to finance the accomodating monetary and economic
policies, stimulated the development of the securities market and de-
creased the predomínance of indirect finance, i. e. increased direct
fínance in Japan. The decline in the situations of overborrowing and
indirect finance decreased the importance of credit in the monetary
policy process.
The process of financial líberalisation, whích started in the first
half of the seventies, increased the flexibilíty of interest rates.
This development decreased the effectiveness of the channel between
interbank interest rates and broadly based lending by banks of the
traditional monetary policy.
Another problem for the effectiveness of the traditional monetary
policy was caused by the large-scale issues of government bonds. The
main part of these í ssues was absorbed by banks, i .e. money creating
financial institutíons. As a result the money supply increased rapid-
ly.
It will be clear from the above that the target of the traditional15
monetary policy, i.e. the broadly based lendíng of banks to the
corporate sector, neglected the money creating effect of the govern-
ment bond issues.
It was mostly for this reason that the Bank of Japan introduced in
1978 a new target, namely the money supply: from July 1978 to the
third quarter of 1979 the broad based money supply M2 and from the
third quarter of 1979 the monetary aggregate M2tCDs. CDs are certifi-
cates of deposit and can be described as '... short-term deposits with
free interest rates that may be sold to third parties" (Suzuki (1987),
p.80).
It has already been mentioned that the process of financial liberali-
sation decreased the effectiveness of the effects of interbank (money
market) interest rates changes on broadly based lending of banks and
therefore also decreased the ímpact of changes in interbank interest
rates on the money supply. Financial liberalisation caused the creati-
on of more open, relatively non-regulated financial markets with more
flexible interest rates. As a result of this development two additío-
nal channels of transmission between interbank interest rates and
money supply were established.
The first was the channel of financial disintermediation. Because open
markt interest rates were more flexible than bank deposit intereat
rates, which were still regulated, changes in interbank intereat rates
had a greater impact (through interest rate arbitrage) on open markt
interest rates. Depositholders were more inclined to invest funds on
the open markets when a rise in interbank interest rates caused open
market interest rates to rise. As a result the funding positíon and
consequently the amount of lending of banks deteriorated.
The second channel included the effects of changes in interest rates
on private expenditure. Interbank (money market) interest rate changes
caused open market interest rates to change and eventually even
interest rates of broadly based lending by banks. As a result the
opportunity costs of expenditures by surplus sectors (i.e. the yields
on open market investments) and the costs of financing of expenditures
by deficit sectors changed. These changes influenced the amount of
private expenditures and eventually the level of national income,
money demand and money supply.
The transmission process of the new monetary policy is presented in
figure 6. Seen against the background of the inflationary experiences16
in the first part of the seventies, the main goal of the new monetary
policy became the achievement of price stabilíty. The yenjU.S.dollar
exchange rate was introduced as a secondary target to stress the
importance of preventing import inflation.
FIGURE 6 The new monetary policy
Amount of Bank of Japan credit
Discount rate
Reserve ratio operations
Securities and bills operations







THE MODERN MONETARY POLICY 1981-
The year 1981 was the turning point towards a new type of monetary
policy, the so called modern monetary policy. In May of that year the
Bank of Japan started to sell financing bílls on the open market to
absorb liquidity surpluses. According to Suzuki (1987) '... Th1a was
the first time since the end of the Second World War that the Bank of
Japan had engaged in an open-market operation in the true sense of the
term" (Suzuki (1987), p.322), í.e. the buying and selling of securí-
ties by the central bank on the open market to increase respectively
decrease directly the size of the money supply.
The already mentioned securities and bills operations are engaged
between the Bank of Japan and money creating financial ínstitutíons.
Therefore, these operations do not have a direct effect on the money
supply. The Bank of Japan uses the securities and bills operations as
an instrument to provide the Japanese economy with additional base
money without directly disrupting the growth of the money supply. How-
ever, the securities and bills operatíons do have indirect effects on
the money supply.
Firstly, buying or selling by the Bank of Japan of securities and
bills in possession of money creating financial institutions increases
or decreases the amount of reserves of these institutions. The money
creating financial institutions will try to compensate the changes in
their reserves on the interbank markets. As a result, changing inter-17
bank (money market) interest rates will induce portfolio adjustments
by these financial institutions and will consequently change the
amount of their lending and eventually the the size of the money
supply. Nowever, the process of liberalisation of interest ratea will
make this channel less important.
Secondly, the above mentíoned changing of interbank (money market)
interest rates will influence interest rates on the open markets and
in the end the level of private investments, money demand and money
supply.
The main reason to introduce open market operations by the Bank of
Japan was the development of open, less regulated financial markets in
Japan. The processes of financial liberalisatíon and financial inter-
nationalisation induced the introduction and development of new
financial markets, such as for example the market for certificates of
deposit (1979) and the Euroyenmarket and later on the introduction of
markets for bankers acceptances (1985), money market certificates
(1985) and commercial paper (1987) and the Tokyo offshore market
(1986). The interest rates on these markets are relatively free. As a
result the share of the open markets in the total money market increa-
sed rapídly.
The Bank of Japan could influence to a certain extent the ínterest
rates on the open markets through the mechanism of interest rate
arbitrage between the interbank and open markets. To keep the channel
of ínterest rate arbitrage effective, the Bank has introduced in the
past decade a great number of ineasures to improve the interest rate
arbitrage between the interbank and the open markets, the most recent
ín November 1988. However, the mechanism of interest rate arbitrage
alone is not sufficient to control the interest rates on the open
markets. Other factors, including differences ín market expectations
and different characteristics of various segments of the open markets,
determine also open market interest rates. Furthermore, the declining
share of the interbank markets in the total money market made ít more
difficult for the Bank of Japan to ínfluence the interest rates on the
open markets only by use of interest arbitrage. Therefore, the last
decade saw the introduction of the open market policy as an instru-
ment to exert direct influence on the open markets by the Bank of
Japan. The Bank has used in its open market policy various instru-
ments, such as treasury bills (first in May 1981), certíficates of18
deposit and commercial paper (May 1989). The Bank of Japan intends to
eatend the use of treasury bills as an open market instrument. For
this purpose the market for treasury bills, which is still relatively
small and underdeveloped, will have to expand and gain in importance.
To facilitate the open market policy of the Bank of Japan, the Minis-
try of Finance has introduced in August 1989 three month treasury
bills and considers, according to The Asian Wall Street Journal
(1989), to expand the issues of treasury bílls in 1990.
The open market operations of the Bank of Japan have great conse-
quences for the money supply. The money supply is ínfluenced through
three channels by these operations.
In the fírst place, the exístence of a direct mechanism has to be
mentioned. For example, when the Bank of Japan sells treasury bills
directly to the non-financial sector the money supply will decrease.
When the Bank of Japan sells treasury bills to money creating financi-
al ínstítutíons, which received permíssion from the Bank to resell the
bills to the non-financial sector, the money supply will also decrea-
se. The consequence of this operation is a deteriorating reserve
position of the financial institutions concerned (decrease of deposit
at Bank of Japan). As a result, these financial institutions will
borrow funds on the interbank (money) market to make up their defi-
cits. The resulting increase in interbank (money market) interest
rat.es will lead through the mechanism of ínterest rate arbitrage to
risíng open market interest rates, i.e. rising costs of private
expenditures. It will be clear that in the end the level of national
íncome, money demand and money supply will tend to decrease. This
indirect mechanism is the second channel between the open market
operations and the money supply. In the third place the open market
operations have great consequences for the supply and demand relations
on the secondary market of treasury bills, certífícates of deposit or
commercial paper and consequently for the interest rates on these
markets. Through the channel of interest rate arbítrage the other open19
market interest rates wíll be influenced and finally (the familiar ef-
fects of interest rate fluctuations on private expenditures) the money
supply.
The above mentioned channels are presented in figure 7. It is also
shown that both the money supply and the U.S.dollar~yen exchange rate
are used as targets by the Bank of Japan. The Japanese central bank
wants to achieve the goal of price stability on the one hand by
controlling the growth of the money supply (the internal track) and on
the other by keeping the yen on a sufficiently high level against the
U.S.dollar to prevent import inflation (the external track). It seems
for example, according to Hutchison (1986), that in the most recent
years the Bank of Japan focuses more on the external track, but it is
difficult to judge precisely to what extent.
Fínally, besides the open market operations two additional new instru-
ments have to be mentioned: the poínts system and the lending plan.
The points system was introduced in january 1988 to stop the diminis-
hing share of the interbank (money) markets ín the total money market.
In this system the amount of credit of the Bank of Japan indívidual
banks are entitled to is inversely proportional to the amount they
borrow in the open markets. The less banks borrow in the open markets,
the more points and consequently the more Bank of Japan credít they
are allowed to receive. The lending plan is an informal agreement
between the Bank of Japan and the banking sector regarding the sea-
sonal adjusted quarterly growth of gross short and long term banking
credit.zo
FIGURE 7 The modern monetary policy
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FOOTNOTES
1) However, measured by the strengh of capital only six Japanese banks
are placed in the world top 10. See: 'Top 1000 world banks', The
Banker, July 1989, pp. 38-105.
2) This group includes the Bank of Tokyo which is really a foreign
exchange bank to finance international trade. See: Y. Suzuki (ed.),
The Japanese Financial System, Oxford, 1987, pp. 163-304.
3) It should be noted that financial innovations blur the distinction
between short-, medium- and long-term. See for an extensive díscussion
of Japanese financial markets: Y. Suzuki (ed.), The Japanese Financial
System, Oxford, 1987, pp. 108-162.
4) These financial innovations and their effects on monetary policy
are extensively discussed in: Y. Suzuki A H. Yomo (ed.), Fínancial
Innovation and Monetary Policy: Asia and the West, Tokyo, 1986, pp.
45-78.
5) The maturity for calls was changed from overnight to 3 weeks into22
overnights to 6 days and for bills from 1-6 months into 1 week-6
months. Thus the overlap in maturity between calls and bills was
eliminated. In April 1989 the maturity for bills was even extended to
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